Court Filing
Electronically Filed
8/27/2026 6:18 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County Trent Tripple, Clerk of the Court
By: Caterina Moritz Gutierrez, Deputy Clerk Gregory R. Rauch, ISB # 7389 Magyar, Rauch & Associates, PLLC 326 E 6th Street Moscow Idaho 83843
Tel: (208) 882-1906
Fax: (208) 882-4540 nppd@mralegal.com Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
BRYAN KOHBERGER, Case No.: CV01-26-15094 Petitioner, MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE FOR CAUSE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. Rule 40 (b)
VS. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST
FOR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO, PURSUANT TO Rule 40 (c) Respondent.
COMES NOW Petitioner Bryan C. Kohberger (" Kohberger "), by and through undersigned counsel, and respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Disqualify the Honorable Steven Hippler for Cause pursuant to IRCP 40 (b) (1) (D), or, alternatively, requesting that the Court exercise its discretion to voluntarily disqualify pursuant to IRCP 40 (c).
INTRODUCTION
This motion does not rest upon one adverse ruling, one harsh statement, or the mere fact that the judge who presided over Bryan Kohberger's criminal case has been assigned to his postconviction proceeding. It rests upon the extraordinary convergence of all of them.
Before Kohberger ever pleaded guilty, the constitutional adequacy of his defense team's preparation was not merely foreseeable. It was expressly, and uniquely litigated.
Trial counsel told this Court that necessary discovery review and investigation could not be completed under the existing capital-trial schedule. Counsel represented that necessary investigation remained unfinished, that investigation into potential alternative perpetrators remained incomplete, and that unresolved “ red flags ” —impacting Kohberger's ability to defend himself-required further investigation. Counsel warned that proceeding under those circumstances threatened Kohberger's constitutional right to effective representation.
At the June 18 hearing, counsel made the problem plainer still: the defense was not prepared to go to trial; all discovery had not been reviewed; significant matters remained unknown; and the
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gap between identified “ red flags " and completed investigation was precisely where ineffective assistance could occur. See Exhibit 1 at 5: 25—6: 3; 7: 17-22; 8: 24–9: 23¹.
Judge Hippler rejected those concerns. And he did considerably more than deny a scheduling request. In the public June 26 Order, Judge Hippler affirmatively judged the legitimacy of counsel's asserted preparedness problem. He characterized counsel's discovery complaints as “ ultimately empty, ” concluded that counsel was invoking the extraordinary discovery volume as a tactic for delay rather than because of a legitimate threat to Kohberger's substantial rights, and described the issue as a " tactical sword ” untethered to a seriously legitimate concern about counsel's ability to be prepared. The Court separately concluded that the defense investigation already “ readily appears to satisfy " the professional standards relied upon by the defense and ultimately declared that, after two and one-half years, the defense team “ must be satisfied with what they have. ” The Court therefore denied additional time. The State continued to seek death. The trial remained on course. Six days later, there was no trial. Kohberger pleaded guilty. That chronology may or may not establish, by itself, that his plea was constitutionally defective. That question remains to be investigated and adjudicated. But neither can the chronology be sanitized nor ignored.
The Court did not create whatever shortcomings may have existed in trial counsel's preparation before June 26. It did, however, make the judicial decision that converted those asserted shortcomings from a problem for which counsel was seeking additional time into conditions under which Kohberger would be required to confront an impending capital trial. The June 26 Order thereby became more than procedural history. It became an operative event in the factual sequence surrounding the challenged plea.
The PCR court may now have to determine whether counsel actually was adequately prepared; what discovery remained unreviewed; what investigation remained unfinished; whether counsel possessed sufficient information to intelligently advise Kohberger; what counsel told him about her preparedness and the evidence; whether counsel's advice was constitutionally adequate;
and whether the imminent prospect of proceeding to a death-penalty trial under those circumstances materially contributed to the decision to plead guilty.
And there is another unusual wrinkle. Only six days after Judge Hippler found trial counsel's preparation concerns essentially empty and tactical, the Court asked Anne Taylor during the plea colloquy: " Have you been able to do all the discovery you feel necessary? " 1 All citations to bold font “ Exhibits ” reference and refer to the Declaration of Gregory Rauch, filed alongside and in support of this Motion.
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Taylor answered: “ Yes, Your Honor. ” See Exhibit 2 at 10: 24—11: 1.
The PCR may now require a factfinder to reconcile those representations with what counsel had said only days earlier.
The same is true of Kohberger. At the plea hearing, Kohberger told Judge Hippler that he had sufficient time to decide, was pleading voluntarily, was satisfied with counsel's advice, believed pleading guilty was in his best interest, believed counsel had done everything he requested, and was satisfied with the representation. Judge Hippler found the plea freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Id. at 33: 18-25.
Standing alone, Idaho precedent permits a judge to revisit such prior findings in postconviction proceedings. But the record did not end there.
Three weeks later, at sentencing, Judge Hippler publicly questioned whether Kohberger was even " capable of speaking the truth " and predicted that any explanation from him would consist of “ self-serving and aggrandizing untruthful bits. ” Id. at 110: 2-10.
Those statements are fundamentally different from believing Kohberger committed terrible crimes or deserved severe punishment. They are forward-looking judgments about his credibility.
And credibility may now be at the center of this proceeding.
The same judge who asked Kohberger questions under oath on July 2, who may now be asked whether Kohberger's answers should be accepted at face value, thereafter, publicly questioned whether Kohberger is capable of speaking truthfully at all. That is but one of the problems.
It exists alongside the Court's prior categorical findings concerning counsel's preparation. It exists alongside the Court's own role in maintaining the imminent capital-trial setting. And it exists alongside other intensely personal sentencing statements referring to Kohberger as a “ faceless coward, " a person who “ slithered " into the victims ' home, the “ worst of the worst, " and someone in whom the Court could identify nothing remaining that was " good or intrinsically human. " Id. at 106: 25; 107: 7-8; 111: 14-19.
Kohberger recognizes that Idaho law does not automatically disqualify a sentencing judge because that judge formed strong views about a defendant. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988). This motion does not ask the Court to disregard Beam. It asks the Court to recognize that this case presents far more than Beam.
The question is not merely whether Judge Hippler has formed strong views about Kohberger.
The question is whether an informed and reasonable observer could question the impartiality of having the same judge:
(1) adjudicate whether trial counsel's preparation concerns were genuine after previously
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declaring those concerns essentially empty and tactical;
(2) adjudicate whether the capital-trial predicament materially contributed to the challenged plea after the Court's own discretionary ruling preserved that predicament;
(3) resolve factual conflicts between trial counsel's pre-plea representations and her representations six days later;
(4) determine whether Kohberger's plea-colloquy answers should be credited; and (5) determine Kohberger's credibility after publicly questioning whether he is capable of telling the truth and predicting that his future explanations would be untruthful.
Idaho law requires more than confidence in the subjective absence of bias. It protects the appearance of impartial justice. Under these exceptional circumstances, reassignment is warranted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial Counsel Expressly Placed Her Ability to Prepare an Effective Capital Defense Before the Court.
On May 20, 2025, trial counsel moved to continue the capital trial. Counsel did not frame the request as one of convenience. She represented that it was “ impossible " to review and integrate the necessary discovery under the existing schedule while also completing necessary investigation, including investigation into alternative perpetrators and unresolved “ red flags. " The motion expressly tied the requested time to the ability to mount an effective defense. See Exhibit 3 at pp. 28-29.
The significance of those representations is important. The present ineffective-assistance issue was not invented after the guilty plea.
Before Kohberger surrendered his right to trial, the lawyers responsible for defending his life were already telling the Court that substantial work remained unfinished; including review of potentially exculpatory evidence. Counsel reinforced those representations at the June 18 hearing.
Among other things, counsel stated that the defense had not reviewed everything, substantial investigation remained unfinished, significant matters remained unknown, and that Kohberger had a right to proceed with prepared counsel who had completed a full investigation. Trial counsel expressly connected the unfinished work to the risk of ineffective representation. See Exhibit 1 at 6: 6-7; 6: 20–7: 25; 11: 10-18; Exhibit 3 at pp. 28-29.
This was contemporaneous evidence concerning counsel's professed state of preparation in the subject criminal proceeding itself. It was not retrospective PCR advocacy.
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B. A Court-Imposed Alternative-Perpetrator Deadline Passed While Counsel Maintained That the Underlying Discovery Review and Investigation Remained Incomplete.
On April 18, 2025, the Court entered its Order Memorializing Oral Rulings on Motions in Limine. With respect to the State's motion concerning alternative-perpetrator evidence, the Court recognized that such offers of proof ordinarily could be made at trial but concluded that the complexity of this case warranted resolving them in advance. The Court therefore ordered the defense to present any alternative-perpetrator offer of proof no later than May 14, 2025, so the issue could be addressed at the pretrial conference.
The May 14 deadline passed. Six days later, on May 20, counsel moved to continue the capital trial and expressly advised the Court that counsel still needed time to complete “ investigations relating to the merits phase-including into alternative perpetrators. ” Exhibit 3 at p. 28.
Counsel represented that review of the discovery remained incomplete and that further investigation was necessary to mount an effective defense.
The June 26 public Order itself confirms that the issue remained unresolved. The Court stated that counsel had not fully reviewed thousands of law-enforcement tips and that counsel maintained those tips could lead to evidence of an alternative perpetrator. The Court then observed that " [t] he deadline for presenting alternate perpetrator evidence has come and gone, ” with no motion by the defense to extend it. Exhibit 4 at p. 4.
This sequence provides a concrete illustration of the predicament trial counsel was describing. A Court-imposed deadline governing an important defense avenue had expired while counsel continued to maintain that discovery review and resulting investigation remained incomplete.
The constitutional adequacy of counsel's handling of that deadline, whether additional investigation would have produced admissible evidence, and whether any deficiency affected Kohberger's decision to plead are merits questions not presented by this motion.
The relevance here is narrower: Judge Hippler was not merely aware in the abstract that counsel wanted additional preparation time. He had presided over the deadlines constraining that preparation, knew that counsel maintained the underlying work remained unfinished, and thereafter relied upon the expiration of one such deadline when rejecting counsel's request for additional time.
C. The Court Also Received Additional Information Under Seal Concerning Why Further Time Was Allegedly Necessary.
The Court additionally received an ex parte, sealed supplement identifying further reasons counsel asserted additional time and expert assistance were necessary. Because those matters remain
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sealed, Petitioner does not disclose them in this public memorandum.2 Their significance to the present motion is addressed in Petitioner's sealed submission, filed contemporaneously with this Motion.
D. Judge Hippler Rejected the Legitimacy of the Asserted Preparation Problem in Express and Categorical Terms.
The June 26 Order did not merely conclude that counsel had failed to satisfy the legal standard for a continuance. Judge Hippler expressly found counsel's complaints about an inability to meaningfully review discovery “ entirely unconvincing. ” The Court criticized counsel's failure to obtain additional resources and specifically identified counsel's inability to complete review of thousands of tips and security video. Exhibit 4 at p. 3.
The Court then went substantially further. It concluded that counsel's conduct:
" belie [d] his counsel's ongoing — and ultimately empty-discovery complaints. " Id. at p. 4.
The Court stated that counsel was using the volume of discovery as a tactic to delay the proceeding rather than because of a legitimate threat to Kohberger's substantial rights.
Characterizing the discovery issue as a: “ tactical sword, untethered to [a] seriously legitimate concern about the ability to be prepared. " Id. at p. 4 fn 8.
Those are not neutral scheduling findings. They amount to an affirmative assessment of the legitimacy of counsel's stated preparedness concerns and the Court injecting itself into Kohberger's Constitutional right and ability to prepare a meaningful defense.
The Court similarly evaluated whether additional defense investigation was constitutionally necessary, concluded that the investigation already undertaken “ readily appears to satisfy " the professional standards cited by the defense, rejected further investigation as potentially becoming a " fishing expedition, " and stated: “ At some point and particularly after two and one-half years of investigation-the defense team must be satisfied with what they have. " Id. at pp. 7, 13.
Thus, before the plea ever occurred, Judge Hippler had already expressed definite views concerning matters that may become central PCR factual disputes: whether the claimed preparation problem was genuine, whether the unreviewed discovery likely mattered, whether further investigation was constitutionally warranted, and whether counsel already had enough.
2 Because the May 20, 2025, Ex Parte Supplement and portions of the record concerning the matters described therein remain sealed, Petitioner has intentionally omitted their substance from this publicly filed memorandum.
Those facts are relevant to the appearance issue presented here and are addressed only in Petitioner's sealed submission so that this motion does not itself disclose information previously protected by Court order.
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E. The Order Preserved the Impending Capital-Trial Predicament.
The Court plainly possessed discretion to rule upon the motion for a continuance. But the consequences of exercising that discretion are relevant here. The Order did not itself complete the discovery review counsel said remained unfinished. It did not conduct the investigation counsel said remained undone. It did not answer the unresolved questions counsel said required further expert work. It did, however, eliminate the requested remedy for those asserted problems.
Before June 26, defense counsel sought an additional option: more time to complete the work counsel claimed was constitutionally necessary. After June 26, that option was gone. When a plea agreement emerged days later, Kohberger then confronted a stark choice: accept a disposition that removed the death penalty from the case or proceed toward the imminent capital trial under conditions his own lawyers had just represented were constitutionally inadequate. At that point, the capital-trial setting remained intact.
The PCR court may now be required to determine whether counsel's preparation concerns were factually well-founded and constitutionally consequential. If so, the June 26 ruling was not merely an earlier judicial opinion that the PCR judge would later reconsider; it was a judicial action that preserved the circumstances under which the challenged plea decision thereafter had to be made.
F. Six Days Later, Kohberger Pleaded Guilty.
Four days after the June 26 ruling, Kohberger signed a plea agreement. On July 2 — six days after the Court denied additional preparation time-Kohberger appeared before Judge Hippler.
Judge Hippler disclosed that he had learned of the agreement only Monday afternoon and previously believed the case would proceed to trial. Exhibit 2 at 7: 1-5. Petitioner expressly acknowledges that fact. This motion does not allege that Judge Hippler negotiated, solicited, intended, or knowingly caused the plea. The issue is objective consequence, not subjective intent.
At the hearing, Judge Hippler asked Taylor whether she had sufficient time to discuss the case and its ramifications with Kohberger and whether she had discussed his rights, defenses, and consequences of pleading guilty. Taylor answered yes.
Then came the critical question:
THE COURT: “ Have you been able to do all the discovery you feel necessary? "
MS. TAYLOR: “ Yes, Your Honor. " Only days earlier, the Court had been adjudicating counsel's assertions that substantial discovery review and investigation remained incomplete. The PCR court may now need to determine what changed-if anything between those representations.
Kohberger likewise answered the customary plea-colloquy questions concerning
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voluntariness, threats, promises, satisfaction with counsel, and factual guilt. He denied threats and undisclosed promises and said he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. He said he had enough time, was acting freely and voluntarily, considered the plea in his best interest, was satisfied with counsel's advice, believed counsel had done everything he requested, and was satisfied with counsel's representation.
Judge Hippler consequently found the plea was supported by a factual basis and was freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Exhibit 2 at 33: 18-25. The validity of that surrender of constitutional rights is now challenged.
G. At Sentencing, Judge Hippler Went Beyond Condemning the Crimes and Expressed a Forward-Looking Judgment Concerning Kohberger's Capacity for Truthfulness.
On July 23, Judge Hippler sentenced Kohberger. Some of the Court's statements were extraordinarily severe but may still fall within the area addressed by Beam: condemnation of horrific crimes, the offender, and punishment. However, some statements do not fall within the acceptable scope of Beam. The Court referred to Kohberger as a “ faceless coward " and stated that the individual who " slithered " through